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Abstract 
 
This contribution combines neo-functionalism and historical institutionalism to understand 
the implications of differentiated integration in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
Banking Union (BU) for the single market in financial services in the European Union (EU). 
From the 1980s, the relaunch of the Single Market and monetary integration in the EU were 
presented by the supporters of EMU as mutually reinforcing, as in the logic of the 
Commission’s Report ‘One Market, One Money’. Initially, EMU appeared to reinforce 
financial integration, especially in the Euro Area banking sector, even though EMU was a 
case of differentiated integration in the EU. Subsequently, the incomplete EMU triggered the 
sovereign debt crisis, which undermined financial market integration and was addressed 
through the establishment of BU, which reinforced differentiated integration. Both EMU and 
BU have negative implications for the ‘singleness’ of the single market in financial services, 
potentially resulting in ‘One Money, Two Markets’. 
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Introduction 
 
The single market in financial services is a crucial part of the European Union (EU) single 
market given the importance of finance to economic growth and the implications that finance 
has for other EU policies, and notably macroeconomic policies. As early as 1990, the 
European Commission published an influential report entitled ‘One Market, One Money’ 
(Commission 1990), which was strategically used to promote Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The report was focused in large part upon the galvanising effect that the single 
currency would have for market — and notably financial market — integration (Emerson et 
al. 1992; cf. Gros 2017). Over two decades later, the ‘completion’ of EMU through Banking 
Union (BU), which was put forward by the so-called Four Presidents Report (Van Rompuy 
2012) and was elaborated further by the so-called Five Presidents Report (Juncker 2015), re-
stated the linkage between the Single Market and the Single Currency. The Four Presidents 
Report (Van Rompuy 2012) that outlined the BU project listed the ‘single rulebook’ (that is 
to say, EU banking regulation) as a core component of Banking Union, even though BU 
involved only Euro Area member states and other EU member states that were willing and 
able to join, although none has yet done so.  
 
This contribution examines the interactive dynamics between the Single Currency and the 
Single Market in financial services, with a particular focus on developments in the second 
decade of EMU and, specifically, since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. 
Most of the political science literature to date has focused on either EMU or EU financial 
services governance. This contribution considers how and why these two policy areas have 
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mutually affected each other, and with what outcomes.2 Building on Schimmelfennig (2016), 
we offer novel insights by combining two major theories, one drawn from European 
integration studies — neo-functionalism — and one from political science — historical 
institutionalism to assess the implications of the differentiated integration created by EMU 
and BU, for the Single Market in financial services.  
 
This contribution is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our analytical framework and 
summarises the potential usefulness of neo-functionalism and historical institutionalism to 
explain the impact of the differentiated integration created by EMU on financial market 
integration. Section 3 examines the first decade of EMU and the re-launch of financial market 
integration through the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan, up to the 
international financial crisis and the outbreak of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis. Section 
4 examines the regulatory response of the EU to the international financial crisis, and 
subsequently the EU’s main institutional and policy response to the sovereign debt crisis that 
was BU, and the proclaimed ‘completion’ of EMU. Finally, the contribution reflects on the 
implications of BU for the Single Market in financial services.    
 
Theorising the relationship between monetary integration and (financial) market 
integration 
 
The analysis of this contribution is informed by two theoretical approaches, one drawn from 
European integration theory — neo-functionalism — and one drawn from political science —
 historical institutionalism. These explanations are combined to draw insights to better 
                                                
2 The political science literature on EMU is vast:  we note only some of the major studies, inter alia, Chang 
2009; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Dyson 2000; Hodson 2011; and Verdun 2002. On EU financial market 
integration, see Donnelly 2010; Macartney 2010; Mügge 2010; and Quaglia 2010. There are also a small 
number of political science works that examine both EMU and financial governance, including Dyson and 
Marcussen 2010; Jones, Kelemen and Meunier 2015; Schimmelfennig 2016; and Vilpišauskas 2013). 
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understand the dynamics and implications of differentiated integration in the EU. Both neo-
functionalism and historical institutionalism have been applied to explain European market 
integration (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Pierson 1996) and EMU developments and, most 
recently, the Euro Area crisis (Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Schimmelfennig 2014a; 
Schimmelfennig 2014b; Verdun 2015; Vilpišauskas 2013), the move to BU and the 
differentiated participation of EU member states therein (Kudrna 2016; Dyson and 
Marcussen 2010; Schimmelfennig 2016).  
Neo-functionalism considers three different types of ‘spillovers’ (Haas 1958; Niemann and 
Ioannou 2015; Schmitter 1970; Vilpišauskas 2013). ‘Functional spillovers’ are driven by 
economic dynamics in the policy field and result from previous but incomplete integration. 
Thus, the principal functional logic for adopting a single currency stemmed from the 
Mundell-Fleming ‘unholy trinity’ or ‘monetary trilemma’, whereby the preference for fixed 
exchange rates and the liberalisation of capital flows — both designed to bolster market 
integration in Europe —would prevent most member state governments from pursuing 
autonomous monetary policy. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, then a high-ranking Bank of Italy 
official — and a future ECB Executive Board member and Italian Minister of Finance — 
made an addition to the monetary trilemma with the explicit aim of linking the need for a 
single currency with the European Community (EC) internal market, thus proposing the 
‘inconsistent quartet’ (Padoa-Schioppa 1982). The addition of ‘free trade’ to the monetary 
trilemma was logically problematic and unnecessary — capital liberalisation was an 
important element of European market integration. However, it was useful for those seeking 
to promote EMU — creating a stronger theoretical foundation to the spillover relationship 
between market integration and the Single Currency. 
 
5 
 
‘Political spillovers’ derive from the preferences of business interest groups and civil society 
in favour of policy supranationalisation. In particular, transnational economic interest groups 
and companies engaged in cross-border business tend to support further integration that 
facilitates gains from economies of scale, for example, by reducing the costs of having to 
comply with a variety of different national regulation (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). This 
was notably the case in the relaunch of the single market in financial services, which was 
strongly supported by the most competitive parts of the financial industry that sought cross 
border opportunities to expand their business (see Macartney 2010; Mügge 2010).  
 
Lastly, ‘cultivated spillovers’ are generated by the preferences and active efforts of 
supranational actors, such as the European Commission and, more recently, the ECB, to 
further the integration process (see also Niemann and Ioannou 2015). This aspect is also 
emphasised by the literature on supranational governance, which builds on neo-
functionalism, and several works that consider supranational leadership on both market and 
monetary integration (Jabko 1999, 2006; Posner 2005) and the strategic efforts to link the 
two. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the European Commission promoted both market 
integration and monetary integration as mutually reinforcing. Indeed, a solution to the 
‘inconsistency’ of the quartet mentioned above could have been to renounce semi-fixed 
exchange rates. However, the Commission insisted that the gains of the Single Market could 
not be optimised without a Single Currency: notably in the influential publication ‘One 
Market, One Money’ (Commission 1990; see also Emerson et al. 1992). 
 
Neo-functionalist spillovers overlap with historical institutionalism’s path dependency. In one 
of the earliest applications of historical institutionalism to European integration, Pierson 
(1996) developed a two-step process of endogenous change. First, member states lose control 
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of the integration process due to, among several factors, the unintended consequences of 
spillovers resulting from high issue density, the activities of supranational bodies and the 
creation of new actors. Second, member states can fail to reassert control over the direction of 
integration because of institutional barriers, including the difficulty of treaty and EU 
legislative reforms and the endogenous interdependence created by EU-level policy 
developments, which involve both sunk costs and exit costs, which, in turn, can exceed the 
benefits that states can gain from leaving or reversing an integrated policy. In such a 
situation, member state governments might also accept further integration in order to reduce 
inefficiencies and negative externalities created by the integrated policy area.  
 
The concepts of spillovers and path dependency have been used to explain ‘differentiated 
integration’ in the EU, that is to say, ‘a situation in which states participate in EU policies at 
different levels of integration or EU rules are not uniformly valid across states’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2016, see also Schimmelfennig 2014b; Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and 
Rittberger 2015; Leruth and Lord 2015).3 Dyson and Sepos (2010) define differentiated 
integration as ‘the process whereby European states … opt to move at different speeds and/or 
towards different objectives with regard to common [European] policies. It involves adopting 
different formal and informal arrangements (hard and soft)’. The focus on differentiated 
integration to examine the relationship between EMU, BU and financial market integration 
makes sense because only a subset of EU member states opted to participate in EMU and BU, 
whereas all member states participated in market integration which remains the 
‘constitutional core’ of European integration (Howarth and Sadeh 2010; see also Dyson and 
Marcussen 2010). In this context, both neo-functionalism — and its focus on  spillover — 
and historical institutionalism – and its focus on path dependency – would lead us to expect 
                                                
3 See Schimmelfennig et al. 2015 for a more detailed discussion of definitions of differentiated integration.  
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that Euro Area member states would be subject to different spillovers and a distinct path 
dependency compared to ‘euro-outsiders’. Schimmelfennig (2016) demonstrates the 
importance of path dependency with regard to the move to BU and the non-participation of 
‘euro-outsiders’. In our contribution — combining neo-functionalism and historical 
institutionalism in the context of differentiated integration in specific areas — notably, EMU 
and BU, we hypothesize the following: 
 
EMU and BU both create spillover pressures and path dependency that have worked and will 
continue to work to undermine the single market. 
 
Alternative explanatory frameworks that might be applied to examine the relationship 
between EMU and financial market integration include Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
versions of Constructivism. Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998; Schimmelfennig 
2015) would explain developments in terms of the preferences of powerful member state 
governments which, in turn, reflect the preferences of powerful domestic economic 
constituencies. A ‘battle of systems’ (Story and Walters 1997) — in which member state 
governments defend the interests of differently configured national financial systems —
delayed financial market integration and ensured the persistence of major differences among 
Euro Area member states on financial regulatory developments. Thus, national governments 
half-heartedly supported financial market integration and this resulted in a limited delegation 
of powers to the EU level to achieve this — for example, the creation of the EU supervisory 
authorities with limited policy making powers. Intergovernmentalism has been criticized, 
inter alia, for considering national preferences as static and mostly exogenous to the 
integration process (Wincott 1995). Indeed, empirically, there are instances in which national 
preferences on a given policy or issue have changed over time due to spillover effects 
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emphasized by neo-functionalist accounts. Notable instances have been member state 
governments’ support for the supranationalisation of banking supervision and resolution in 
response to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area, as explained below.  
 
An application of Constructivism involves placing emphasis on the intensification of identity 
construction of the member state actors most involved in EMU (McNamara 1998, Risse et al. 
1998) and the spread of specific ideas that, then, reinforced the need for financial market 
integration. For neo-functionalists too, the focus would be on socialization pressures that 
stemmed from the operation of EMU and encouraged political and cultivated spillover into 
additional areas of policy making. However, given that some of the EU member states among 
the most consistently in favour of further financial market integration and ‘market-making’ 
reforms (Quaglia 2010, 2012) remained obstinate euro-outsiders — notably, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden — whereas a number of Euro Area member states remained 
strongly reticent on financial market integration — notably, Germany — the application of a 
constructivist framework in this regard appears problematic. While the ‘market-shaping’ 
perspective dominated in most Euro Area member states and directed government policy, a 
number of Euro Area member states — notably, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg —  
 consistently allied with ‘market-making’ euro-outsiders on financial regulatory issues. 
 
The first decade of EMU and the ‘completion’ of the Single Market in financial services 
 
The beginning of the third and final stage of EMU was the starting point of a form of 
differentiated integration in the EU. It can be seen as constituting a ‘critical juncture’ placing 
Euro Area member states and euro-outsiders on different paths of policy and institutional 
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development.4 One the one hand, EMU created a series of functional, political and cultivated 
spillovers. On the other hand, these spillovers were stronger for the EU member states 
participating in the incomplete and asymmetric Euro Area than for the euro-outsiders. 
 
To begin with, there were functional spillovers from EMU. In the first decade of EMU, the 
Single Currency substantially contributed to financial market integration, albeit skewing it 
significantly in favour of the Euro Area, especially in the banking sector, and thus creating a 
de facto two-speed financial market integration. The elimination of foreign exchange 
transaction costs linked to the elimination of national currencies had significant 
microeconomic benefits in the financial sector — where even hundredths of a per cent have 
an impact — and far greater than for the trade in goods which was at best limited (Gros 
2017). Cross-border banking, cross-border holdings of sovereign and corporate debt, and the 
use of cross-border collaterals all increased markedly in the Euro Area (see Figure 1).5 
Hence, in this period financial market integration progressed in the EU as a whole, even 
though banking integration increased more substantially in the Euro Area, bolstered by the 
harmonisation of debt levels, good economic growth in much of the euro periphery and 
growing current account surpluses in a number of northern Euro Area member states and, 
above, all Germany. This can be seen as the first major distortion of EU financial market 
integration created by EMU. 
 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                
4 There are, arguably, previously important critical junctures in monetary integration and differentiated 
integration. The first was the start of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 and the decision by the UK 
government not to participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (Dyson and Sepos 2010). The second 
was the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty which imposed specific macroeconomic policy and institutional 
requirements upon member states seeking to participate in EMU’s third stage, which the euro- outsiders did not 
have to meet. 
5 There are no readily available figures for financial market integration in the EU more generally (Gros 2017). 
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EU, and notably Euro Area, financial market integration brought about a significant increase 
in bank credit-to-GDP and thus bank leverage, which had both a domestic and a cross-border 
dimension. The increase in leverage took place throughout the EU but it was greatest in the 
Euro Area periphery — Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Cyprus. The increase also 
eventually brought to the fore the tensions summarised by Schoenmaker (2013) in the 
‘financial trilemma’ of financial integration (especially, cross-border banking), national 
financial policies (regulation, supervision and resolution) and financial stability. Any two of 
the three objectives could be combined, but not all three. Whereas the trilemma — which was 
reminiscent of the functionalist logic of the Mundell-Fleming ‘unholy trinity’ used to 
advocated the move to EMU in the 1980s — applied internationally and throughout the EU, it 
was particularly acute and ultimately untenable in the Euro Area. On the one hand, the Single 
Currency reinforced financial (banking) integration in the Euro Area. On the other, the Single 
Currency undermined national financial policies, because the function of lender of last resort 
could no longer be performed at the national level. Moreover, national bank recovery and 
resolution powers were constrained by EU fiscal rules. The sovereign debt crisis in the Euro 
Area, which followed the international financial crisis, can be seen as the extreme 
manifestation of the trilemma (Howarth and Quaglia 2016), as elaborated in the following 
section.  
 
In EMU, there were important cultivated spillovers. The Commission and, especially, the 
European Central Bank (ECB), played an important role in promoting financial market 
integration which was seen as essential for the ECB to be able to conduct efficiently a single 
monetary policy throughout the Euro Area and fulfil its price stability mandate (Gabor and 
Ban 2016). The ECB decision to treat as equivalent the sovereign debt of all Euro Area 
member states ensured the near complete convergence of sovereign debt yields — regardless 
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national inflation rates and country-specific risks (ECB 2000, 2002). However, this move 
also created the second major distortion in financial market integration stemming from 
differentiated integration, with banks — especially those in northern creditor countries —
 purchasing larger and larger quantities of euro periphery sovereign debt. The Commission 
and the ECB actively encouraged the construction of a European (and specifically Euro Area) 
repo market with the aim of integrating Euro Area securities markets. While Commission 
efforts started prior to 1999 and focused on the entire EU (The Giovaninni Group 1999), 
significant progress relied upon ECB action focused on the Euro Area. Gabor and Ban (2016) 
explain how the ECB performed a unique role in driving financial integration though its role 
in creating euro liquidity through repo loans (see ECB 2015). By treating all Euro Area 
sovereign debt as identical collateral for its lending to banks, the ECB in effect encouraged 
banks participating in the repo market to Europeanize their sovereign collateral.  
 
In the first decade of EMU, there were also EU-wide legislative efforts to promote the 
completion of the Single Market in financial services. In June 1998, the heads of government 
and state called upon the European Commission to develop a framework for action to 
improve the Single Market in financial services (European Council 1998). In May 1999, the 
European Commission issued the Financial Services Action Plan, which proposed a set of 
new financial services legislation that was market-making, that is to say, intended to further 
market integration (Quaglia 2010; Donnelly 2010; Macartney 2010; Mügge 2010). The 
adoption of these legislative measures during the 2000s was facilitated by the reform of the 
framework for financial regulation and supervision in the EU in the early 2000s, the so-called 
Lamfalussy reforms.  
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An example of the potential legislative and policy implications of EMU as a form of 
differentiated integration concerned the clearing of euro denominated assets. In 2011, the 
ECB issued a policy paper that called for legislation requiring CCPs to be based in the Euro 
Area if they handled ‘sizeable amounts’ (specifically, more than 5 per cent of the clearer’s 
total business) of a euro-denominated financial product (ECB 2011a). This recommendation 
came in the context of a long-standing debate over the authorisation and supervision of CCPs 
in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), on which the UK government 
had won an important concession, prohibiting discrimination against any member state as a 
venue for clearing services (Howarth and Quaglia 2017). The ECB’s euro-clearing policy can 
also be seen as an example of cultivated spill-over as the ECB sought to extend its remit into 
new areas in order better ensure financial stability, which was part of the ECB’s mandate. 
The ECB and supportive Euro Area member states argued that only the ECB had sufficient 
euro holdings to ensure the clearing of large amounts of euro-denominated financial products 
and maintain financial stability, especially during crisis periods.  
 
The UK challenged the ECB’s recommendation before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
on the grounds that the ECB’s policy recommendation would restrict the free movement of 
capital and infringe upon the right of establishment — two core elements of the Single 
Market. The ECB responded by a clarification of its clearing house location policy in a 
November 2011 document (ECB, 2011b), against which, in February 2012, the British 
government launched a second ‘technical’ legal challenge. The CJEU found in favour of the 
UK and swap arrangements between the ECB and the Bank of England were put in place to 
allay ECB financial stability concerns — thus avoiding what could have become a major 
legislative division between the Euro Area financial market and the EU financial market. 
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The principal legislative initiative at the EU level that potentially contributes to legal 
differentiation on financial services concerns the adoption of a financial transactions tax 
(FTT), which was to raise revenue for the EU budget (Gabor 2016). In September 2011, the 
European Commission proposed EU legislation on the FTT after failure in the G20 to make 
headway on the issue at the international level. After threats by the UK government to veto 
draft legislation, it was suggested that the tax only apply to Euro Area member states (Torello 
and Horobin 2011). However, several Euro Area member state governments were also 
opposed. The member states then agreed to use the EU’s enhanced cooperation procedure 
allowing a minority of member states to proceed with the FTT. In May 2014, ten EU member 
states agreed to introduce an FTT by the start of 2016. However, the division did not 
correspond to Euro Area membership. While all participating member states were in the Euro 
Area — including the four largest national economies — a number of Euro Area member 
states refused to participate — including Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and Ireland. 
To date final adoption of the FTT by national governments has been postponed. Thus, this 
form of differentiated integration remains only potential. 
 
Overall, in the 2000s, prior to the international financial crisis, EMU and the re-launch of 
financial market integration proceeded almost in parallel. The differentiated integration of 
EMU had not yet significantly placed the two on competing paths despite the increased 
intensity of financial integration among Euro Area member states compared to euro-
outsiders. However, EMU generated a variety of spillovers that sowed the seeds for further 
integration in the Euro Area in the following decade, after the ‘double whammy’ of the 
financial crisis first, and the sovereign crisis later, as discussed in the next section. 
Furthermore, the differentiated integration set in place by EMU was path-dependent because 
the spillovers of EMU applied to Euro Area member states only, not to the entire EU. Finally, 
14 
 
it could be argued that the rapid increase in financial market integration supported by the 
adoption of the single currency, the noted macroeconomic trends, and ECB action on 
sovereign debt may also have undermined EU-level efforts to adopt market-making 
legislation designed to ensure durable financial market integration. Indeed, Grossman and 
Leblond (2011: 414) argue that ‘progress in the area of regulatory integration’ was 
substantial, whereas it was less so in ‘market-integration’. This might, therefore, be posited as 
an example of how differentiated integration in EMU worked to distort and even undermine 
— albeit indirectly — financial market integration. 
 
Crises and Banking Union   
 
From 2007 onwards, the EU was hit by two consecutive crises that threatened at the same 
time financial stability, financial integration and the Single Currency. The EU’s response to 
the international financial crisis was a host of new financial regulation. The international 
financial crisis also revealed the weaknesses of existing macroprudential oversight in the EU 
and the inadequacy of nationally based supervisory models in overseeing integrated financial 
markets with cross-border operators. Following the report of the de Larosière Group (2009), 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established to monitor macro-prudential 
risks in the EU. The so-called level three Lamfalussy committees were transformed into 
independent EU authorities with legal personality, an increased budget and enhanced powers 
(Hennessy 2013). These authorities, namely the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), were charged with the tasks of issuing binding 
technical standards and promoting stronger cooperation between national supervisors.  
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The response of EU institutions and the member state leaders to the sovereign debt crisis was 
the proposal to complete EMU through the establishment of BU (see De Rynck 2016; 
Donnelly 2014, Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Epstein and Rhodes 2016). In June 2012, the 
European Council and Euro Area summit agreed to complete EMU through the creation of 
BU, which was to be based on four components: a single framework for banking supervision; 
a single framework for banking resolution; a common deposit guarantee scheme; and a 
common backstop for temporary financial support. These four components rest on the EU’s 
single rule book on banking that applies to all EU member states. In October 2013, the 
Council of Ministers approved the Regulation for the establishment of a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). In July 2014, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
approved the Regulation for the setting up of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) with 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The third and fourth elements — the planned Common 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme and the common backstop for temporary financial support of the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) — escaped agreement. 
BU was necessary in order to deal with the negative functional spillovers of EMU which 
emerged because of the inadequacy of the existing institutional set up to deal with problems 
arising. Exogenous shocks highlighted EMU’s incomplete institutional set up and increased 
pressure on Euro Area insiders to move ahead with further integration to ‘fix the problem’, so 
as to avoid the costs of potential EMU collapse (Schimmelfennig 2016). According to this 
functionalist logic, BU was necessary in order to break the ‘doom loop’ whereby weak 
domestic banking systems damaged sovereign fiscal positions, and weak sovereign positions 
threatened domestic banking stability. Since banks — especially in the Euro Area periphery 
— held large quantities of government bonds, the sovereign debt crisis weakened the capital 
position of banks, increasing their funding costs on the market, while the ‘fragility of the 
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banks undermined the borrowing status of the sovereign that [had] to stand behind them’ 
(Begg 2012, p. 15; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018).  
As mentioned in the previous section, the acute trilemma in the Euro Area meant that the 
safeguard of financial stability was outside the control of national authorities and could only 
be achieved at the Euro Area level. For these reasons, Euro Area member states agreed (in 
some cases with great reluctance) to transfer prudential supervision and resolution from the 
national to the supranational level (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). BU was to replace the third 
element of Schoenmaker’s trilemma, namely, national financial policies. All EU member 
states, including the euro-outsiders that would not join BU, supported more or less the project 
— which was widely regarded as a solution to the sovereign debt crisis. However, British 
policy-makers, supported by seven other non-euro member states, threatened to block BU if 
there were insufficient safeguards put in place for the ‘euro-outsiders’ (Financial Times, 8 
November 2012). The British feared the adoption of subsequent financial legislation that 
would be detrimental to the British financial sector. However, the broader issue of concern 
was the satisfactory co-existence of more integrated Euro Area member states and the euro-
outsiders, which is examined in the next section. 
 
As for cultivated spillover, the ECB was the main supranational institution involved in the 
making of BU (Epstein and Rhodes 2016; De Rynck 2015), thus assuming, in part, the policy 
entrepreneurship performed by the Commission in the making of EMU. Prior to the debate on 
BU, some senior ECB officials (for example, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa) had expressed 
support for the ECB to take over supervisory functions (Howarth and Loedel 2005). 
However, this was not official ECB policy. During the BU debate, the ECB was a keen 
supporter of all four proposed elements of BU and centralised competences (ECB 2012). 
Finally, there was also political spillover because EMU gave momentum to cross-border 
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banking and the formation of transnational banking groups, which advocated more 
harmonised financial regulation and supervision, especially in the banking sector, in order to 
reduce their compliance costs (Culpepper and Tesche 2018) and challenge ‘banking 
nationalism’ (Epstein 2018). ‘Forging a European banking market’ was a key official 
objective of BU (Nouy 2017). Transnational banking groups also promoted BU to diminish 
the risks created by their large Euro Area sovereign debt holdings. 
 
Banking Union and European financial market integration  
 
Banking Union will have significant implications for EU financial market integration. First, 
BU will contribute to increase financial integration in the Euro Area, hence reinforcing a de 
facto ‘market within a market’. BU ensures better application of the single rule book on 
banking in BU member states, reduces home versus host supervisory differences, and 
diminishes opportunities for regulatory and supervisory arbitrage in favour of banks — 
protectionism. Second, the creation of BU potentially promotes the formation of a coalition 
of member states with similar interests and thus, potentially, voting as a block on a range of 
EU financial (banking) regulatory issues. On the one hand, when EMU was set up a similar 
concern existed but in the end failed to materialize. The Euro Area hardly ever voted as a 
block on financial legislative measures (see Quaglia 2010). On the other hand, whereas EMU 
was mainly about the Single Currency, BU concerns banking, which is directly relevant to 
financial market integration. Ferran (2014: 9) argues that ‘needs and preferences that arise 
within EBU are likely over time to have spillover effects and to exert an increasingly strong 
influence over the contents of [EU banking] regulation’. A similar prediction can also be 
made with reference to supervisory policies and practices (Ferran 2014). 
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Third, there were concerns regarding potential tensions between Euro Area / BU member 
state and euro-outsider preferences on the guidelines and technical standards adopted in the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) to direct EU-wide banking supervision. At the start of 
negotiations on BU, the UK government feared that a Euro Area / BU majority would be able 
to impose its preferences on banking supervision on non-Euro Area members in the EBA 
(Financial Times, 13 December 2012). Hence, the UK government demanded an EBA voting 
reform, whereby any decision by the Authority should be approved by a ‘double majority’ of 
member states inside and outside the BU. The European Commission and a number of Euro 
Area member state governments opposed the voting reform on the grounds that it would 
result in the creation of two decision-making fora (Financial Times, 13 December 2012).  
Most Euro Area member states also expressed concern that in the event that the number of 
non-BU member states declined, the UK supervisors would enjoy effective veto powers 
(Financial Times, 8 November 2012).   
 
The outcome was a compromise involving the creation of a ‘double majority’ system until the 
number of non-BU member states declined to fewer than four. Thus, participation in the Euro 
Area was to determine voting rights and inequality was enshrined in EU legislation. A small 
number of euro-outsider member state supervisors — five following the expansion of the 
Euro Area to nineteen members — had the power to block decisions on banking supervision 
sought by the supervisors from all the Euro Area member states. While the compromise on 
EBA double majority voting provided some assurance that the Single Market would be 
protected — insofar as the supervision of banks was concerned —it did so at the expense of 
the equal treatment of member states. 
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Fourth, and related to the previous point, there is a potentially uneasy relation between the 
EBA, which remains responsible for developing guidelines and technical standards on 
banking supervision for the entire EU, and the SSM, which has the ECB at its centre, and 
which was assigned both supervisory and regulatory powers. Wymeersch (2014) and Gren 
(2014) point out the partial overlaps of the EBA and SSM jurisdictions concerning non-
legislative guidelines and technical standards for the banking sector. For example, the 
development of the EBA supervisory handbook that reflects best supervisory practices across 
the EU and the ECB/SSM supervisory manual must be carefully managed in order to avoid 
potential inconsistencies. Here several examples of potential divergence can be provided 
including the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). The EBA is responsible 
for developing EU-wide guidelines on the SREP. At the same time, the SSM Supervisory 
Manual also provides for the BU’s common supervisory methodologies, such as the 
methodology for risk assessment and capital and liquidity quantification within the SSM 
SREP.  
 
Although the ECB insists that the SREP for BU and developed in conformity with the EBA’s 
SREP guidelines (ECB, 2014: 14), the potential for divergence remains. In fact, the less 
comprehensive that the EBA’s guidelines are, the more likely that inconsistencies between 
the Single Market and BU will arise — a concern expressed by Andrea Enria, the EBA 
Chairperson himself (Enria 2013: 8). On the one hand, this convergence-promoting work 
across BU member states should alleviate the burden on the EBA to promote convergence 
throughout the EU. On the other hand, the ECB’s efforts are ‘likely to result in pressure on 
the EBA to promote an EU-wide model that is very heavily influenced by the ECB’s 
approach’ (Ferran 2014: 9-10; see also Lastra 2015). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
ECB has become more assertive in EBA discussions on the matter (Gren 2014). As 
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emphasised by the EBA Chairperson, the danger of creating inconsistent regulatory and 
supervisory regimes for banks established in the EU and in BU is considerable and the threat 
to the integrity of the Single Market very real (Enria 2013). 
 
Finally, the most significant impact of BU on EU financial market integration will be in terms 
of its impact upon the operation of Europe’s banks, and above all its largest banks. BU 
headquartered banks may opt to transform non-BU branches into subsidiaries to enable them 
to escape ECB direct supervision in the SSM and ensure regulatory and supervisory arbitrage. 
Or BU headquartered banks may opt to transform non-BU subsidiaries into branches in order 
to extend ECB supervision. Non-BU headquartered banks might opt for similar strategies 
depending on national regulatory and supervisory arrangements. The Nordea Bank example 
highlights the perceived de facto split in the EU banking market that has arisen because of the 
SSM. In September 2017, Nordea — then the largest Swedish-headquartered bank and the 
nineteenth largest EU-headquartered bank by assets — confirmed that it was moving its 
headquarters to Helsinki, merging with its Finnish subsidiary. Officially, Nordea explained 
the move in terms of wanting its headquarters to be inside BU (Milne 2017). It argued that 
the move would reduce costs significantly because the bank would be subject to the direct 
supervision of the ECB which would then coordinate the supervision of its non-BU located 
subsidiaries. Björn Wahlrros, Nordea’s chairman, explained the move also in terms of the 
European banking market and competition: ‘We see the move as an important strategic step 
in positioning Nordea on a par with its European peers. The level playing field and 
predictable regulatory environment offered by the banking union are, we believe, in the best 
interest of Nordea’s customers, shareholders and employees’ (quoted in Milne 2017). 
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Conclusion 
 
This contribution has examined the impact of the differentiated integration created by EMU 
upon the Single Market in financial services, by combining theoretical insights from neo-
functionalism and historical institutionalism. In the 1980s and 1990s, the policy goals of 
financial and monetary integration reinforced one another, according to the logic of ‘One 
Market, One Money’. The incomplete, asymmetric EMU, which began operation in 1999, 
was a critical juncture that reinforced differentiated integration in the EU. In the first decade 
of EMU, prior to the financial and sovereign debt crises, there was no significant tension 
between EMU and financial market integration — they both largely pushed in the same 
direction — although the increase in financial market integration in the Euro Area was far 
greater than in the EU due both to the inevitable impact of removing transaction costs but 
also due to cultivated spillover through ECB efforts on the repo market and collateral. 
Principally on the location of euro clearing was there potential for political and cultivated 
spillover from EMU’s differentiated integration but also for conflict between the ECB, Euro 
Area member states and euro-outsiders. 
 
From 2012, Euro Area member state governments agreed to ‘complete’ EMU through 
Banking Union. BU will likely have important implications for the Single Market in financial 
services (at least, in banking), potentially resulting in ‘one money, two markets’. A number of 
recent developments in both the public and private sectors demonstrate this potential. 
Although bureaucratic politics might have directed his rhetoric, Andrea Enria, the EBA 
Chairperson, saw good reason to emphasise publicly the risks of BU undermining the Single 
Market. To this example, we can add the potential for divergence on insolvency laws. A good 
number of high ranking EU policy makers — including the SRB director, Dominique 
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Laboureix (2019) — have called for a BU-wide harmonisation of insolvency laws for banks 
in order to ensure the more effective operation of the SRM. In the private sector, Nordea’s 
decision to relocate its headquarters to a BU member state is only the most obvious of a range 
of bank decisions that have been shaped by the creation of the SSM and have a de facto 
impact on the Single Market. Bank decisions over whether to convert branches into 
subsidiaries or the reverse in order to determine the supervisor — the ECB in BU or a 
national supervisor outwith BU — with significant implications for bank capital requirements 
will also shape the real operation of the Single Market in banking. This subject alone merits 
further examination for which we lack space in this contribution.  
 
Schimmelfenning (2016: 499) notes that ‘differentiated integration in one policy area can 
spill over into functionally related neighbouring policy areas’. The potential effects of BU on 
the Single Market in financial services have already emerged. Although it is still too early for 
an overall assessment, either euro area outsiders will align increasingly with the regulatory 
standards set by the euro area, or tensions between the two markets will continue and 
potentially increase because of further differentiation. It is unlikely that euro outsiders will 
join EMU just because of these tensions.6 
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